(d) The oath or declaration required by paragraph (a) of this section may be submitted under the provisions of § 1.53(f).

The reissue oath/declaration is an essential part of a reissue application and must be filed with the application, or within the time period set under 37 CFR 1.53(f) along with the required surcharge as set forth in 37 CFR 1.16(e) in order to avoid abandonment.

The question of the sufficiency of the reissue oath/declaration filed under 37 CFR 1.175 must in each case be reviewed and decided personally by the primary examiner.

Reissue oaths or declarations must contain the following:

- (A) A statement that the applicant believes the original patent to be wholly or partly inoperative or invalid—
- (1) by reason of a defective specification or drawing, or
- (2) by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than patentee had the right to claim in the patent;
- (B) A statement of at least one error which is relied upon to support the reissue application, *i.e.*, as the basis for the reissue;
- (C) A statement that all errors which are being corrected in the reissue application up to the time of filing of the oath/declaration arose without any deceptive intention on the part of the applicant; and

(D) The information required by 37 CFR 1.63.

These elements will now be discussed:

A STATEMENT THAT THE APPLICANT BELIEVES THE ORIGINAL PATENT TO BE WHOLLY OR PARTLY INOPERATIVE OR INVALID BY REASON OF A DEFECTIVE SPECIFICATION OR DRAWING, OR BY REASON OF THE PATENTEE CLAIMING MORE OR LESS THAN PATENTEE HAD THE RIGHT TO CLAIM IN THE PATENT.

In order to satisfy this requirement, a declaration can state:

"Applicant believes the original patent to be partly inoperative or invalid by reason of a defective specification or drawing."

Alternatively, a declaration can state:

"Applicant believes the original patent to be partly inoperative or invalid by reason of the patentee claiming more or less than patentee had the right to claim in the patent."

Where the specification or drawing is defective and patentee claimed more or less than patentee had the right to claim in the patent, then both statements should be included in the reissue oath/declaration. See MPEP § 1412.04 for an exemplary declaration statement when the error being corrected is an error in inventorship.

The above examples will be sufficient to satisfy this requirement without any further statement.

Form paragraph 14.01 may be used where the reissue oath/declaration does not provide the required statement as to applicant's belief that the original patent is wholly or partly inoperative or invalid.

¶ 14.01 Defective Reissue Oath/Declaration, 37 CFR 1.175(a)(1)
- No Statement of Defect in the Patent

The reissue oath/declaration filed with this application is defective because it fails to contain the statement required under 37 CFR 1.175(a)(1) as to applicant's belief that the original patent is wholly or partly inoperative or invalid. See 37 CFR 1.175(a)(1) and see MPEP § 1414. [1]

Examiner Note:

- 1. Use this form paragraph when applicant: (a) fails to allege that the original patent is inoperative or invalid and/or (b) fails to state the reason of a defective specification or drawing, or of patentee claiming more or less than patentee had the right to claim in the patent. In bracket 1, point out the specific defect to applicant by using the language of (a) and/or (b), as it is appropriate.
- 2. Form paragraph 14.14 must follow this form paragraph.

II. A STATEMENT OF AT LEAST ONE ERROR WHICH IS RELIED UPON TO SUPPORT THE REISSUE APPLICATION (I.E., THE BASIS FOR THE REISSUE).

A reissue applicant must acknowledge the existence of an error in the specification, drawings, or claims, which error causes the original patent to be defective. *In re Wilder*, 736 F.2d 1516, 222 USPQ 369 (Fed. Cir. 1984). A change or departure from the original specification or claims represents an "error" in the original patent under 35 U.S.C. 251. See MPEP § 1402 for a discussion of grounds for filing a reissue that may constitute the "error" required by 35 U.S.C. 251. Not all changes with respect to the patent constitute the "error" required by 35 U.S.C. 251.

Applicant need only specify in the reissue oath/declaration one of the errors upon which reissue is based. Where applicant specifies one such error, this requirement of a reissue oath/declaration is satisfied. Applicant may specify more than one error.

Where more than one error is specified in the oath/declaration and some of the designated "errors" are found to not be "errors" under 35 U.S.C. 251, any remaining error which is an error under 35 U.S.C. 251 will still support the reissue.

The "at least one error" which is relied upon to support the reissue application must be set forth in the oath/declaration. It is <u>not</u> necessary, however, to point out how (or when) the error arose or occurred. Further, it is <u>not</u> necessary to point out how (or when) the error was discovered. If an applicant chooses to point out these matters, the statements directed to these matters will not be reviewed by the examiner, and the applicant should be so informed in the

(d) The oath or declaration required by paragraph (a) of this section may be submitted under the provisions of § 1.53(f).

The reissue oath/declaration is an essential part of a reissue application and must be filed with the application, or within the time period set under 37 CFR 1.53(f) along with the required surcharge as set forth in 37 CFR 1.16(e) in order to avoid abandonment.

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- These elements will now be discussed:

A STATEMENT THAT THE APPLICANT BELIEVES THE ORIGINAL PATENT TO BE WHOLLY OR PARTLY INOPERATIVE OR INVALID BY REASON OF A DEFECTIVE SPECIFICATION OR DRAWING, OR BY REASON OF THE PATENTEE CLAIMING MORE OR LESS THAN PATENTEE HAD THE RIGHT TO CLAIM IN THE PATENT.

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Where the specification or drawing is defective and patentee claimed more or less than patentee had the right to claim in the patent, then both statements should be included in the reissue oath/declaration. See MPEP § 1412.04 for an exemplary declaration statement when the error being corrected is an error in inventorship.

The above examples will be sufficient to satisfy this requirement without any further statement.

Form paragraph 14.01 may be used where the reissue oath/declaration does not provide the required statement as to applicant's belief that the original patent is wholly or partly inoperative or invalid.

¶ 14.01 Defective Reissue Oath/Declaration, 37 CFR 1.175(a)(1)
- No Statement of Defect in the Patent

The reissue oath/declaration filed with this application is defective because it fails to contain the statement required under 37 CFR 1.175(a)(1) as to applicant's belief that the original patent is wholly or partly inoperative or invalid. See 37 CFR 1.175(a)(1) and see MPEP § 1414. [1]

Examiner Note:

- 1. Use this form paragraph when applicant: (a) fails to allege that the original patent is inoperative or invalid and/or (b) fails to state the reason of a defective specification or drawing, or of patentee claiming more or less than patentee had the right to claim in the patent. In bracket 1, point out the specific defect to applicant by using the language of (a) and/or (b), as it is appropriate.
- 2. Form paragraph 14.14 must follow this form paragraph.
- II. A STATEMENT OF AT LEAST ONE ERROR WHICH IS RELIED UPON TO SUPPORT THE REISSUE APPLICATION (I.E., THE BASIS FOR THE REISSUE).

A reissue applicant must acknowledge the existence of an error in the specification, drawings, or claims, which error causes the original patent to be defective. *In re Wilder*, 736 F.2d 1516, 222 USPQ 369 (Fed. Cir. 1984). A change or departure from the original specification or claims represents an "error" in the original patent under 35 U.S.C. 251. See MPEP § 1402 for a discussion of grounds for filing a reissue that may constitute the "error" required by 35 U.S.C. 251. Not all changes with respect to the patent constitute the "error" required by 35 U.S.C. 251.

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Where more than one error is specified in the oath/declaration and some of the designated "errors" are found to not be "errors" under 35 U.S.C. 251, any remaining error which is an error under 35 U.S.C. 251 will still support the reissue.

The "at least one error" which is relied upon to support the reissue application must be set forth in the oath/declaration. It is <u>not</u> necessary, however, to point out how (or when) the error arose or occurred. Further, it is <u>not</u> necessary to point out how (or when) the error was discovered. If an applicant chooses to point out these matters, the statements directed to these matters will not be reviewed by the examiner, and the applicant should be so informed in the

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II. PACTUAL BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff purportedly has rights in U.S. Patent No. 5,568,207 (the "'207 Patent") for a particular type of magnetic "clip-on" eyeglasses. See Def.'s Ex. 7 ('207 Patent). The patent was issued on October 22, 1996, and identifies the inventor of the device disclosed therein as a person by the name of Richard Chao ("Chao"). See id. at

A. DESCRIPTION OF THE PATENTED DEVICE

The '207 Patent relates to an eyeglass device comprising a primary spectacle frame for supporting primary lenses therein, and an auxiliary frame (colloquially known as the "clip-on" frame) for supporting auxiliary lenses. ('207 Patent, Abstract). The '207 Patent specifies an arrangement whereby the auxiliary frame is engaged to the primary spectacle frame using "magnetic members." See id. The two magnetic members of the primary frame are secured within "projections" that are in turn secured to the "rear and side portions" of the primary spectacle frame. ('207 Patent, col. 1, lns. 50-52 & Fig. 3). The two magnetic members of the auxiliary frame are secured to the "arms," which are in turn secured to the two "side portions" of the auxiliary frame. (Id. at col. 1, lns. 54-55 & Fig. 4). The arms of the auxiliary frame extend over, and engage with, the upper portion of the primary spectacle frame, such that the magnetic members of the two frames engage with each other. (Id. at lns. 55-58 & Fig. 6). The arrangement prevents the auxiliary frame from moving downward relative to the primary spectacle frame, thereby enabling the auxiliary frame to be stably supported. (Id. at col. 1, ln.62 - col.2, ln. 2).

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B. DEFENDANT'S INVALIDITY COUNTERCLAIM

On February 17, 1999, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, on the grounds that its magnetic eyewear infringed upon the '207 Patent. See Pl.'s Compl. On March 11, 1999, Defendant filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that the '207 Patent is invalid, and an affirmative defense of invalidity. See Def.'s Counterclaim & Answer.

Defendant bases its invalidity claim on the contention that an inventor by the name of Julie Madison ("Madison") is the first true inventor of the device claimed in the '207 Patent. Madison is the holder of U.S. Patent No. 6,149,269 (the "'269 Patent") for "Eyeglasses Having Magnetically Held Auxiliary Lenses." See Def.'s Ex. 1 ('269 Patent). Madison applied for the patent on April 18, 1997, and the '269 Patent was issued on November 21, 2000. See id. The '269 Patent describes itself as an improvement over prior art because of its "uniblock" design:

Eyeglasses and clip-ons are improved by providing housings for magnets for securing the clip-ons in a uniblock also incorporating one or more of the following: parts of closing block, an end piece, and part of a hinge. The structure is more compact, neater in appearance, and of improved quality as compared to eyeglasses incorporating conventional structures . . .

See '269 Patent, Abstract. See also id. at col. 1, Ins. 38-42

("In eyeglasses constructed in accordance with the prior art, the piecemeal assembly of closing block, end piece, magnet housing and temple-piece hinge produces a structure that is unduly strung out or elongate, and the housing for the magnet is bulky and unsightly.") Significantly, the '269 Patent identifies the device disclosed in the '207 Patent as a prior art reference. See id. at 1 (References Cited); id. at col. 1, lns. 13-25 ("Eyaglasses

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equipped with one or more magnets adapted to secure an auxiliary lens in superimposed relation to a primary lens are known and disclosed for example in Chap U.S. Pat. No. 5,586,207.")

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As described by Madison, a monoblock configuration is one where "all the parts, the rimlock, the hinge, and in this case the magnet, the end piece, are constructed from a single piece of metal." Madison Depo., Vol. 1 at 45.

^{2 &}quot;Q: Now, did you prepare any notes or writing that related to this conception?

A: Yes.

Q: And in what format did you maintain those notes?

A: Some are in notebooks, some are on -- depends on where I was. Some were on box cops. Depending what I was doing at that time. Some were on random pieces of paper."

²⁸ See Madison Depo., Vol. 1 at 27-28.

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Also in the summer of 1994, Madison allegedly met with a person by the name of Mr. Kimura, who worked for a company called Sunreeve. See id. at 30; Madison Depo., Vol. 2 at 177. At their meeting in Norwood, New Jersey, Kimura purportedly showed Madison a sample of magnetic eyewear wherein the magnets were placed in a front-mounted configuration. See Madison Depo., Vol.1 at 32:21-33:24. As they discussed the sample, Madison asserts that she disclosed certain aspects of the invention she had conceived. See id_ at 34. Specifically, Madison purportedly discussed her idea for magnetic eyewear with back-mounted magnets. See id., see also id. at 47 (Madison's testimony that she disclosed "the substance of" her U.S. Patent application to Kimura). However, Madison did not disclose any of her previously-made notes and drawings to Kimura. See Madison Depo., Vol. 2 at 207-208. Instead, Madison and Kimura purportedly made drawings during the course of their meeting, incorporating Madison's uniblock design. See id. In addition, Madison asked Mr. Kimura and Sunreeve to create an eyeglass sample with top-mounted magnets and a monoblock configuration. See id. at 177, 190. While Madison did not enter into any formal confidentiality agreement with Kimura or Sunreeve (see Madison Depo., Vol. 1 at 44:12-45:2), Madison testified that she did expect Kimura to refrain from disclosing her ideas and drawings to other people within the industry. See Madison Depo., Vol. 2 at 210-211.

[&]quot;Q: Would it be fair to say . . . that your discussions with Mr. Kimura that day in Anaheim when you went over these drawings were not meant to be disclosed to anyone else in the industry?

A: I had expected that he would go back to his office and discuss it with his technical people 'cause he's not a technical - although

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At a subsequent meeting in Anaheim, California in October of 1994, Kimura informed Madison that Sunreeve could not produce a sample of a top-mounted monoblock design, because of the technical difficulties it posed. See Madison Depo., Vol. 2 at 177-178; 190-192; 205:9-18. Thereafter, in April 18, 1997, Madison applied for, and subsequently received, the '269 Patent.

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed the instant patent infringement action against Defendant on February 17, 1999. Defendant filed an Answer on March 11, 1999. Defendant also filed two counterclaims. The first counterclaim seeks a declaration that its frames do not infringe the '207 Patent, and the second counterclaim seeks a declaration that the '207 Patent is invalid.

On June 2, 1999. Defendant filed a motion to stay this action pending the conclusion of an interference proceeding by the PTO to determine who, as between Richard Chao and inventor Toshikazu Iwamoto, was the first to invent the device claimed in the '207 Patent. On September 10, 1999, the Court ordered a stay

he's very bright, he's not the technical guy.

Q: Now, you expected him to talk to people within Sunreeve?

A: Right.

Q: Right. But you didn't expect him to go to talk to other people within the industry?

A: Correct.

Q: Did you want him to keep the information a secret?

A: That would be yes."

See Madison Depo., Vol. 2 at 210-212.

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of the action. On or about May 30, 2000, Richard Chao prevailed in the interference proceeding, and the Court thereafter vacated the stay on July 25, 2000.

On April 12, 2001, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment on Defendant's invalidity counterclaim and affirmative defense. Defendant filed an opposition on April 23, 2001, to which Plaintiff replied on April 30, 2001.

IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court shall grant a motion for summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis of the summary judgment motion, and of demonstrating the absence of a

^{&#}x27; In its motion, Plaintiff also represents that Defendant agreed to dismiss its fifth affirmative defense of statute of limitations, and its minth affirmative defense of laches. See Totino Decl. \$2 5 Ex. A. Defendant's opposition does not indicate whether it agrees with this representation. As these affirmative defenses are not made a part of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the Court will not dismiss such defenses in the absence of a stipulation between the parties.

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genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Celotex Com. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Katz v Children's Hosp of Orange County, 28 F 3d 1520, 1534 (9th Cir. 1994). On an issue for which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once this initial burden is satisfied, the nonmoving party is required to "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate 'specific facts' showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal quotations omitted). See also Nilsson. Robbins, Dalgarn, Berliner, Carson & Wurst v. Louisiana Hydrolec, 854 F. 2d 1538, 1544 (9th Cir. 1988). Where the standard of proof at trial is preponderance of the evidence, the non-moving party's evidence must be such that a "fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [non-moving party] on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

v. ANALYSIS

A. LEGAL STANDARD FOR PATENT INVALIDITY

Patents enjoy a statutory presumption of validity. See 35
U.S.C. § 282 (1994). The party seeking to establish a patent's
invalidity must do so by clear and convincing evidence. Id.; Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories. Inc., 222 F.3d 973, 980 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). "If the evidence requires the fact finder to draw
extensive inferences, the evidence does not satisfy the clear and
convincing proof requirement." Hay & Forage Industries v. Now

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Holland North America, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1119 (D.Kan. ı 1998).

"[A] moving party seeking to have a patent held not invalid at summary judgment must show that the nonmoving party, who bears the burden of proof at trial, failed to produce clear and convincing evidence on an essential element of a defense upon which a reasonable jury could invalidate the patent." Id.

A patent may be rendered invalid if it is anticipated by prior art. Invalidity based on anticipation is described in 35 U.S.C. § 102(2):

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before invention thereof by the applicant for the patent.

See 35 U.S.C. \$102(a). In essence, this statutory provision requires an invention to be "new" in order to be patentable. See I Chisum, Chisum on Patents, §3.01 at 3-3 (2000).

Here, Defendant argues that the Madison drawings disclosed to Kimura constitute prior art that anticipates and invalidates the '207 Patent, To withstand Plzintiff's motion for summary judgment. Defendant must produce sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable finder of fact to find patent invalidity on this basis by clear and convincing evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. at 254.5

³ As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff argues that Defendant precluded from arguing anticipation because Madison's own patent refers to the Chao invention as a prior art reference. See '269 Patent at 1 (References Cited); id. at col. 1, lns. 13-25. "A statement in a patent that something is in the prior art is binding on the applicant and patentee for determinations of anticipation and obviousness." Constant

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APPLICATION В.

"A patent is invalid for anticipation when the same device or method, having all of the elements and limitations contained in the claims, is described in a single prior art reference." ATD Cornoration v. Lydail. Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 545 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

In order to invalidate a patent based on anticipation, the Court must undertake a three-step analysis. First, the Court must determine whother the purportedly anticipating invention is indeed a prior art reference. See Purdue Pharma L.F. V. <u> Hoehringer Ingelheim, GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).</u> In other words, does the reference pre-date the invention of the patent-in-suit? Second, the Court must compare the claims of the patent-in-suit to the prior art, to determine whether the prior . art reference discloses each and every limitation of the invention claimed in the patent-in-suit. See Heliflix Limited v. Blok-Lok Limited, 208 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See also Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("It is axiomatic that for prior art to anticipate under \$102 it has to meet every element of the claimed invention . . . "). Third, the Court must determine whether the prior art reference was either "known or used by others in this

v. Advanced Micro Devices. Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Thus, Madison's description of the '207 Patent as a prior art reference constitutes an admission of this fact as to Madison. However, Plaintiff identifies no cases, and the Court has found none, indicating that the scope of the admission extends to third parties seeking to raise an invalidity defense. Thus, the Court is hesitant to rest upon this admission alone in assessing the vizbility of Defendant's counterclaim. Nevertheless, it is significant that Defendant places virtually exclusive reliance upon Madison's deposition testimony to prove a contention that Madison herself is barred from making.

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country", or "described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country." 35 U.S.C. \$102(a). Anticipation is a question of fact that is subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard. See In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

1. WHETHER THE MADISON INVENTION IS A PRIOR ART REFERENCE

A reference constitutes prior art only if it predates the date of invention of the device claimed in the patent-in-suit. See 35 U.S.C. \$102(a). The presumptive date of invention for any device is the date upon which a complete patent application is filled in the Fatent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). See Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed.Cir. 1998); Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 34 (1978). A patentee may establish an earlier date of invention, however, by showing either (1) "an earlier reduction to practice," (Purdue, 237 F.3d at 1365); or (2) "an earlier conception followed by a diligent reduction to practice." Id. "Conception and reduction to practice are questions of law, based on subsidiary findings of fact." Id.

Here, the presumptive date of invention of Chao's eyeglass device is November 7, 1995 -- the date Chao filed his patent application with the PTO. See Pl.'s Ex. 7. The presumptive date of invention of Madison's eyeglass device is seventeen months later, on April 18, 1997 -- the date upon which Madison filed her patent application. See Pl.'s Ex. 1. Thus, in order for Defendant to establish that Madison's invention is a prior art reference, it must raise a genuine issue of material fact that Madison either reduced her invention to practice before November 7, 1995, or conceived of her invention and diligently worked to reduce it

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1 to practice before November 7, 1995.

(a) Actual Remuction to Practice

inventor must establish that he actually prepared the composition and knew it would work." Estee Lauder Inc. v. L'Oreal. S.A., 129 F.3d S88, 592 (Fed.Cir.1997); Markman v. Lehman. 987 F.Supp. 25, 30 (1997) ("Proof of actual reduction to practice requires a showing that the apparatus actually existed and that it worked for its intended purpose.") "To establish an actual reduction to practice, an inventor must provide independent corroborating evidence in addition to his or her own statements and documents. such as testimony of a witness other than the inventor or evidence of surrounding facts and circumstances independent of information received from the inventor." Markman, 987 F.Supp. at 30. "The purpose of this rule is to prevent fraud." Id.

Here. Defendant does not attempt to provide any evidence that Madison actually reduced her eyeglass device to practice prior to the filing of the Chao patent application on November 7, 1995. Indeed, the only evidence in the record is the uncorroborated testimony of Madison that the first specimen embodying her patented invention was produced in 1996. See Madison Depo., Vol. 2 at 228-229. Thus, Madison cannot establish priority on this basis.

(b) Conception and Diligent Reduction to Practice

perendant seeks to establish priority on the alternative basis that Madison conceived of her invention, and diligently worked to reduce it practice, prior to November 7,

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1995. Conception "requires proof that the inventor formed in his mind 'a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice. and that the idea be 'so clearly defined in the inventor's mind that only ordinary skill would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or experimentation.' Id. (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co v Barr Labs Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed.Cir. 1994). Where a party seeks to show conception though oral testimony of an inventor, it must produce independent evidence corroborating that testimony. See Purdue, 237 F.3d at 1365. Indeed, "[p]roof of an alleged inventor's conception and reduction to practice is a heavy one and requires full corroboration by other than the inventor's own self-serving testimony or records." Potter Instrument Co., Inc. v. Odec Computer Systems, Inc., 370 F.Supp. 198, 206 (D.R.I. 1974) (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 298 F.Supp. 718, 728 (E.D.Tenn. 1969)).

In order to show due diligence in the inventor's reduction to practice, "the patentee must account for the entire critical period between the date of conception and the date of reduction to practice by showing either activity aimed at reduction to practice or legally adequate excuses for inactivity." American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer. Inc., 722 F. Supp. 86, 109 (D.Del. 1989) (citing 3 D. Chisum, Patents \$ 10.07 (1987)). "In addition, the law requires corroboration of diligence during the critical

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period. " American Standard, 722 F. Supp. at 109."

Relying on Madison's deposition testimony, Defendant contends that Madison conceived of her magnetic eyewear in the summer of 1994. See Madison Depo., Vol. 1 at 16:5-19:7; Madison Depo., Vol. 2 at 185-190. The only purportedly corroborating evidence provided by Defendant are declarations of Kimura and Takahiro Nishioka (Deputy Ceneral Manager of Sunreeve) that were allegedly submitted to the PTO in the prosecution of Madison's patent. See Def.'s Opp'n. at 2; Def.'s Exs. 5 & 6. However, Plaintiff properly objects to the admission of the declarations because they are improperly authenticated. "In order for a document to be considered by a court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the document must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit that meets the requirements of Fed.R.Rule.P. 56(e) . . " See Countywide Cil Co., Inc. V. Travelers Insurance Co., 928 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D.NJ. 1995). "Hence, before evidence may be admitted, a foundation must be laid 'by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. " Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)).

Here, the supporting affidavit by defense counsel Crucillo does not state that the declarations are "trus and correct" copies of what they purport to be. See Crucillo Decl. 99 6-7. Indeed, the file history for Madison's '269 Patent nowhere

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The "critical period" of diligence is "from the time just before the entry of a second inventor into the field until a reduction to practice." American Standard, 722 F.Supp. at 114, n.21; Driscoll Cebalo, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1477, 1481 n. 6 (P.T.C. 1982) (diligence is required only "from a time prior to the conception of another").

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includes the foregoing declarations, and Defendant provides no other evidence that the declarations were ever used in the patent prosecution. See Totino Decl., Ex. A. Thus, the Court sustains Plaintiff's objection to the admissibility of the declarations.

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Even if the Court were to assume that conception occurred in the summer of 1994, the record is devoid of evidence concerning Plaintiff's diligent reduction to practice. Again, Defendant relies on Madison's own deposition testimony, which is insufficient as a matter of law because it is uncorroborated. See American Standard, 722 F.Supp. at 109 ("the law requires corroboration of diligence during the critical period.") Even if the inadmissible declarations of Kimura and Nishioka are considered, they are entirely silent as to Madison's attempts, if any, to reduce her invention to practice. In fact, Nishioka's declaration provides the opposite inference when it states: "I replied to Ms. Julie Madison through Mr. Kaoru Kimura that her ideas would not be realized if we used such new construction for magnetic eyewear." See Def.'s Ex. 5, Nishioka Decl. at ¶3.

Thus, Defendant's evidence falls far short of raising a genuine issue of material fact that Madison's ideas and drawings constitute a prior art reference, especially in light of the governing clear and convincing burden of proof. Conspicuously absent from the record are the drawings themselves, upon which the entirety of Defendant's counterclaim is premised. When stripped to its essence, the evidence is nothing more than testimony by the inventor herself, corroborated only by ambiguous and inadmissible declarations. For this reason alone, partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff is appropriate.

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2. WHETHER THE MADISON INVENTION WAS KNOWN OR USED BY OTHERS OR DESCRIBED IN A PRINTED PUBLICATION

Another crucial element of an anticipation defense is proving that the prior art reference was known or used by others, or described in a printed publication, prior to the invention of the device disclosed in the patent-in-suit. See 35 U.S.C. \$102(a).

(1) Description in a Printed Publication

Anticipation by a prior publication occurs where the work adequately describes the invention in question and the work qualifies as a printed publication. See 1 Chisum, Chisum on Patents, \$3.04 at 3-40. In order for a description to be "adequate", it must enable a person with ordinary skill in the art to not only comprehend the invention, but also to make it. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1550 (Fed.Cir. 1989) (a prior art reference *must provide a description sufficient to teach a person of ordinary skill in the art how to make and use the apparatus or process*); Seymour v. Osborn, 78 U.S. 516 (1870).

In order for the prior art reference to qualify as a "printed publication" under 35 U.S.C. §102(a), it must have been "sufficiently accessible to those skilled in the art." In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1160 (Fed.Cir. 1989). This is because "dissemination and public accessibility are the keys to a legal determination whether a prior art reference was 'published'." Id. See also Deep Welding, Inc. v. Sciaky Bros. Inc., 417 F.2d 1227, 1235 (7th Cir. 1969) (distribution of paper at various technological conferences sufficed to constitute publication);

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rompare Preemption Devices. Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 732 F.2d 903 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("the dissemination of six copies to an individual was not a 'publication' . . .").

Here, Defendant's evidence fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the Madison drawings qualify as a "printed publication". The evidence does not indicate that the Madison drawings, assuming that they exist, were made accessible to members of the public. Rather, Madison testified that she did not disclose any drawings in her notebook to Kimura, and that Kimura saw only those drawings that were created in the course of the parties' 1994 meeting in New Jersey. San San Madison Depo., Vol. 2 at 207-208. Moreover, there is no evidence that persons other than Kimura ever saw Madison's drawings, including other employees of Sunreeve. Finally, Madison testified that, while there was no confidentiality agreement with Kimura, she expected Kimura to refrain from disclosing her ideas and drawings to other persons in the optical industry. See Madison Depo., Vol. 1 at 44:12-45:2; Madison Depo., Vol. 2 at 210-211.

Defendant's evidence also fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the Madison drawings were sufficiently detailed to enable a person with ordinary skill in the art to both comprehend the invention and to make it. Indeed, the only evidence submitted suggests that the Madison drawings disclosed to Kimura were not sufficient to enable him to create the sample requested by Madison. See Madison Depo., Vol. 2 at 190-192; 209:9-18; 177-178.

7 "Q: And after you gave [Kimura] specifications [of the top-mounted monoblock design], he later came back to you and said that it could not - 17 -

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(2) Public Knowledge or Use

Anticipation by prior knowledge requires that a complete and adequate description of the prior art reference must have been available to the public. See Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments. Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 881 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd 727 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("the knowledge or use by others required by section 102(a) is public knowledge of a complete and operative device."). In addition, "the knowledge required by § 102(a) involves some type of public disclosure and is not satisfied by knowledge of a single person, or a few persons working together." Nat'l Tractor Pullers Ass'n v. Watkins, 205 U.S.P.Q. 892, 912 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (emphasis added). Again, the inventor's testimony of prior knowledge or use must be corroborated by other evidence. See 1 Chisum, Chisum on Patents, §3.05[2] at 3-73.

In its opposition, Defendant argues that Madison provided her drawings "to Sunreeve via Kimura." See Def.'s Opp'n. at 14. However, Madison's testimony nowhere suggests that she disclosed her drawings to any Sunreeve employees other than Kimura. The

See Madison, Vol. 2 at 177-178.

be done; is that correct?

A: Not right away. He said that they were talking about it, that they were discussing it with technical people.

Q: Right. But the ultimate conclusion was that it was not feasible.?

A: At that time, yes.

Q: So it was at that point in time the manufacturer said it could not be reduced practice; would that be correct?

A: At that moment they had failed to come up with what I considered. to be a workable alternative, or a workable or viable expression of the invention.

Q: And that was in 1994?

A: Yes."

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inadmissible declaration of Nishioka, Deputy General Manager of Sunreeve, itself suggests that he was only verbally informed of Madison's ideas by Kimuza, and does not indicate that Nishioka ever viewed the drawings in question. See Nishioka Decl. at 12 (Kimura "reported to me that Ms. Julie Madison disclosed to him her ideas regarding the new construction of end-piece parts for magnetic eyewear, when he met with her prior to December 9, 1994 at the Anaheim Hilton Hotel in California, U.S.A."). Thus, Defendant's evidence shows, at best, that Madison's drawings were disclosed only to Kimura, which is insufficient as a matter of law to constitute public knowledge. See Nat'l Tractor Pullers Ass'n v. Warkins, 205 U.S.P.Q. at 912.

Having examined all of the evidence, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to patent invalidity. Defendant has failed to submit the Madison drawings, forcing the Court to rely on uncorroborated inventor testimony that her invention constitutes a prior art reference. In addition, there is no evidence that the Madison drawings, even assuming that they qualify as a prior art reference, were disclosed to the public in a manner constituting a "printed publication," or that sufficient public knowledge or use of such drawings occurred. As such, the Court need not reach the third element of patent invalidity -- whether Madison's drawings disclose each and every limitation of the invention claimed in the the '207 Patent.

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VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on Defendant's counterclaim and affirmative defense of patent invalidity.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

8 DATED

LOURDES G. HATRD

United States District Judge

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